Signaling Design https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2502.02328&r=&r=des
"… in the unique equilibrium in our setting, a profit-seeking monopolist school offers an uninformative #signaling technology, generating the same signal regardless of effort, and capture all the surplus in terms of fees. In this case, the separating equilibrium envisaged in #Spence (1973) vanishes, and no wasteful effort is exerted! Competition among schools affects both the total surplus produced and its distribution: competition in fees allows students to retain a higher share of the total surplus … competition to attract high types induces schools to offer more informative monitoring policies, incentivizing higher levels of wasteful effort.
… one equilibrium outcome stands out for its robustness: full separation, yielding the Riley outcome—low-type students exert no effort and high-type students exert the lowest effort that low-types are unwilling to emulate. Thus, compared to the #monopoly case, #competition shifts surplus from the school to high-type students and entails efficiency losses due to socially wasteful effort in equilibrium. The critical driver of this result is the high-type students’ willingness to pay to access a monitoring policy that enables them to better distinguish themselves from low-type students and thus obtain higher #wages."
#GameTheory
To keep you and us busy over the next three months until the end of the current programming period, we spoke to Aya, a former participant, about her project. Take a look at our interview with her 
Household Defense Chart Competition.
of four go to it, spend two weeks at least in the space station, and come back home safely…before the U.S. 
2026) 
